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Cases
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Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Section
_ o_

78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code, and the limitations of Section 78-2-3,
Utah Code.

Nature of Proceedings

This is the second appeal of this case.

This appeal is

from the Amended Judgment entered on remand by the Honorable
Dennis J. Frederick.

Statement of Issues on Appeal

I.
judgment

On
for

remand, did

the lower

court err

the full amount of attorney

fees

in granting
requested by

Cottonwood, without permitting discovery on the reasonableness
of those fees?

II.

Did

the lower

court exceed

its instructions on

remand, when it allowed judgment for attorney fees after the
leased premises were vacated.

Determinative Authorities

Attached hereto as Appendix A, is the controlling case:
- 4 -

the prior decision on appeal in this matter.

Cottonwood Mall

Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).

STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the Amended Judgment entered May
2ndf

1989.

Appendix B.

A copy of that

judgment

is attached hereto as

About half of that amount is for attorney fees.

A

judgment of about $62/000 was also entered against the sureties
Jerry and Dora Sine at the same time.

This appeal is on behalf

of all judgment defendants.

B.

i.

Initial

Course of Proceedings.

proceedings.

Cottonwood

sued

Sine for

unlawful detainer to recover space in the Cottonwood Mall.
2-44.

Cottonwood Bowling Lanesf Inc. intervened.

Sine and Cottonwood

R.

R. 133-34.

(referred to hereinafter jointly as "Sine"

for convenience) counterclaimed to enforce an oral agreement.
R. 53-94; 133-34.

The pleadings were amended various times, and

substantial discovery was conducted.
After trialf Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment

were

entered

in

favor
- 5 -

of

Cottonwood

Mall.

R.

1085-1100; 1223-24.

Sine appealed.

R. 1229-30, 1255-56.

Jerry

and Dora Sine filed a Supersedeas Appeal Bond, which was later
approved.

R. 1231-34. Cottonwood Mall cross appealed the trial

court's failure to award attorney fees.

ii.

Proceedings on appeal.

and argued, and this Court issued
1988.

767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).
a.

The matter was fully briefed
its decision November 17,

This Court held:

Cottonwood Mall, a joint venture, could sue in

its common name without having to name the joint venturers as
parties plaintiff.
b.
had

terminated

agreement

The trial court properly found that the lease
by

its own terms, and that the alleged oral

to renew the lease upon reasonable terms was not

enforceable.
c.

Sine held over after the term of the lease,

creating a month to month tenancy on the same general terms as
the original lease.
d.

Sine had a duty to vacate when requested to do

so on October 23, 1981, and "when

[he] failed to do so, the

provision for the payment of attorney fees became operative.ff
767 P. 2d at 503.

Attorney fees for "actions by the lessor to

secure possession of the premises" should have been awarded to
Cottonwood.

Id.

- 6 -

Sine petitioned for rehearing.

The petition was denied

January 25, 1989.

iii.

Proceedings on remand.

Cottonwood proceeded to

move for an amended judgment against Sine, to include attorney
fees, and also against the sureties on the supersedeas bond.
1770-1775.

Cottonwood

requested

that

the

judgment

R.

include

$57,628.57 principal and

interest, attorney fees through the

trial

interest)

period

post-judgment

(including
attorney

fees

totaling

(including

$39,744.62,

and

appeal) of $6,641.58.

Cottonwood requested compounded interest.
With the proposed judgment Cottonwood's counsel offered
as evidence a three page "Affidavit of Attorney's Fees."
1788-90.

R.

The affidavit was caste in very broad terms.

Sine and the sureties objected
1801-05.

to the judgment.

R.

The parties briefed the issue of what attorney fees

should be awarded, including whether they should include amounts
incurred
claimed

after
and

whether

reasonableness
objection.

iv.
lower

court

judgment,

of

the

reasonableness

discovery

the

fees

should

and

the

be

of

the

allowed

timeliness

of

amount
on

the

Sine's

R. 1802-26.

Disposition at trial.
granted

the

judgment

- 7 -

No new trial was held.
May

The

2, 1990, disallowing

Cottonwood's attempt to compound the interest/ denying Sine's
objection to the proposed judgment and for oral argument.
1827/ 1834-35A.

The total judgment was $98/706.20/ including

pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
amount

$65/400

sureties.

R.

R. 1835A.

is also a judgment against the

R. 1847.

No discovery

was permitted

Of that
supersedeas
as to the

reasonableness or specific nature of the claimed attorney fees.
A copy of the judgment is attached as Appendix B.

v.

New appeal*

Sine and the sureties appealed from the

Amended Judgment May 26/ 1990.
post-judgment remedies.

Cottonwood has proceeded with

R. 1864-1988.

The district court misplaced the record/ and an extension
to file this brief was granted through and including May
1990.

9,

The four volume record was located by the lower court and

delivered to the undersigned counsel the afternoon of May 8/
1990.

C.

Relevant Facts

The facts are as set forth in the prior appeal/ attached
as Appendix

A.

The are also set forth in the immediately

preceding section titled "Course of Proceedings."

This appeal

is procedural in nature and the above indicated procedural facts
are relevant.
- 8 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
aassBssss

'

'

"nBSSsssssas

This Court's remand to award attorney fees did not give
the trial court carte blanche to enter judgment for all amounts
requested/ refusing to allow discovery as to the reasonableness
of the fees.
The Court remanded the case for a determination only of
fees to which plaintiff is entitled "under paragraph 33 of the
written lease".
paragraph/

It was error to go beyond the terms of that

awarding

fees for periods after Sine vacated the

leased premises.

ARGUMENT

1.

This

appeal

is

simply

resolved,

mostly

examination of the Court's opinion in the first appeal.
of that opinion is attached hereto as Appendix "A".

by

an

A copy

The portion

that applies to this appeal is principally contained in the last
page of the opinion.

Cottonwood Mall Company v. Sine/ 767 P.2d

499/ 503 (Utah 1988)/ rehearing denied/ Jan. 25f 1989.
The

trial

attorney fees.

court

initially

denied

Cottonwood

Mall any

On remand the instruction to award them was

limited by the terms of the Opinion/ however.

767 P.2d at 503.

The trial court exceeded its bounds in giving Cottonwood Mall
everything it wanted.

In addition to looking to the language of the decision of
this

Court,

paragraph

controlling.

33

of

the

lease

must

be

considered

A copy of pages eight and nine of the lease,

containing that paragraph, is included as Appendix n C".
The

Opinion

and

paragraph

33

of

the

lease will

be

discussed further below.

2.

Discovery

should

reasonableness of attorney

have

fees.

been

permitted

on

the

This Court instructed the

lower court to "determine and fix the amount of attorney fees
and trial and appeal costs to which plaintiff is entitled under
paragraph 33 of the the written lease."

Id.

The trial judge

received no evidence but an affidavit of Cottonwood's counsel to
"determine" that amount.

R. 1788-90; 1834-36.

All the information on the reasonableness of the fees is
in the exclusive possession of Cottonwood and its counsel.

Yet

Sine was denied access to any of that information, with the
exception of the affidavit.

3.

The affidavit was inadequate.

The affidavit was

extraordinarily general and uninformative.

It is attached as

Appendix D, and essentially states:
a.
b.

The lawsuit required substantial legal work.
Counsel had reviewed his billing records, and

they indicated pre-judgment fees "including office costs passed
- 10 -

on the Plaintiff directly
interest.

R. 1789, App. D, 1[ 3.
c.

Id. 11 4.

(sic)" totaling nearly $40,000 with

The appeal had allowed Cottonwood attorney fees.

Rehearing was denied.
d.

indicates

Counsel's "review of records as referred to above

post-judgment

$6,641.58."

1[ 5.

attorney

fees

in

the

amount

of

Id. 11 6.

The affidavit stated that "office ledger records" were
attached."

11 7.

pages

included.

were

However, only seven mostly unintelligible
Neither

the

affidavit

nor

any other

evidence before the trial court indicated any of the following:
a.

That the fees charged were reasonable.

b.

The breakdown of the fees.

c.

The hourly rate charged for most of the time

periods involved.
d.

The

specific

activities

performed

exception of four entries totaling $718.75).
e.

(with

the

R. 1791.

What portion of the fees was incurred before Sine

vacated the premises.
f.

What portion of the fees was incurred after Sine

vacated the premises.
The sworn statement was only that counsel had reviewed
the records and that they "indicate [d]" the fees claimed.
does not even state that the records are accurate.

- 11 -

It

4.
judgment.

Sine

and

the

sureties

objected

to the proposed

They argued as follows (R. 1802-05; 1816-22):
a.

The fees should be limited to amounts incurred in

obtaining possession of the premises (November 30, 1981).
b.

The interest computation was in error

(not an

issue on appeal).
c.

The fees claimed were unreasonably

high

(142

percent of the original amount claimed of $32,700).
d.
of the fees.

Discovery should be allowed on the reasonableness
R. 1805.

Nevertheless, the trial court essentially accepted the affidavit
at face value, immune to challenge.

5.

Attorney fees were properly subject to discovery.

The scope of discovery is broad.

See, State ex rel. Road Commfn

v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914

(1966).

Rule 26(b)

provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party . . . .
[so long as it] appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).

The scope is surely

broad enough to encompass revelation of the details underlying
such a substantial part of Cottonwood's judgment.

- 12 -

The trial court may limit the extent and frequency of
discoveryf but only if the court
determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more
convenience/ less burdensome, or less expensive/
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is
unduly burdensome or expensive. . . •
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).
permitted
27(b).

during

an appeal.

Discovery may even be

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Of course here the matter was on remand/ and no special

authority was required to allow normal discovery before hastily
entering judgment.
Because all information regarding the reasonableness and
accuracy

of

possession

the

of

attorney

Cottonwood

fee
and

claim

lies

its counsel/

in

the

exclusive

Sine provided

an

affidavit to that effect in compliance with Rule 56(f)/ Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

R. 1821-22.

The affidavit explained

that because of lack of discovery/ Sine and the sureties were
unable to provide a counter-affidavit opposing the attorney fee
amounts

claimed

by

Cottonwood.

Id.

Disregarding

this

affidavit/ the trial court entered judgment without allowing
discovery.

6.
issue.

Trial should have been allowed on the attorney fee

The amount of fees owed could only be determined by the

- 13 -

trial

court

by

evidenciary

hearing,

since

affidavit made the fees a factual issue.

the

Rule

56(f)

This should have

occurred after Sine and the sureties were armed with reasonable
discovery regarding the attorney fee claim.

A mere affidavit

was not competent evidence under the circumstances.

7.

This Court's limits the attorney fees Cottonwood may

collect.

It

is entitled

only

to those

"to which

entitled under paragraph 33 of the written lease."
499, App. A.

[it] is

767 P.2d at

The trial court was bound and could not exceed

this Court's authorization on remand.
The Court's decision itself merely noted that on November
30, 1981 Cottonwood "nullified" the lease, and Sine had a duty
to vacate.

"At that time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and

when it failed to do so, the provisions for the payment of
attorney fees became operative."
App. A.

767 P.2d at 503 (Utah 1988),

And the Court noted that the lease provided for those

fees only for "actions by the lessor to secure possession of the
premises at the expiration of the lessee's term. . . . "

Id.,

emphasis supplied.
Yet neither Cottonwood nor the lower court made an effort
to distinguish the attorney fees expended to gain possession
from

other

fees

incurred.

Cottonwood

regained

possession

shortly after it served its notice to quit, before the trial or
appeal.

Id. at 500.

for those periods?

How can Cottonwood seek recovery of fees

The lease contains no provision for attorney fees for
litigation or appeals concerning other issues.

Issues at trial

and on appeal included the ability of a joint venture to sue in
its own name and various other matters, including the existence
and

terms of an alleged

contract.

oral

lease agreement and/or

option

Most issues litigated had little to do with rent,

much less possession (which had already been obtained).
The

last

sentence

of

the

consistent with this analysis.

Court's

decision

is

also

It instructs the lower court to

"determine and fix" on remand "the amount of attorney fees" and
the "trial and appeal costs" to which Cottonwood is entitled.
767 P.2d at 504 (Utah 1988) f emphasis supplied.
may be awarded for the trial and appeal.

Costs, then,

Fees on the other

hand, are limited by the opinion to repossesing the bowling
alley space at Cottonwood Mall.

8.

Paragraph 33 limits Cottonwood to amounts incurred

during the "terms" of the lease.
language, emphasis supplied.

App. C, 1[ 33, introductory

Under the reasoning of the Court,

this would include the actual term of the lease, as well as the
hold-over period which ended in October, 1981.
(Utah 1988), App. A.

767 P.2d at 503

Under no rationale could the attorney fee

clause apply to periods after the lease expired.

- 15 -

CONCLUSION
The

matter

must

be

remanded

to

the

trial

discovery and a trial on the attorney fee issue.

court for
The lower

court should be instructed on remand to award no attorney fees
incurred after cottonwood recovered the premises.

Respectfully submitted this ninth day of May, 1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused an original and
copies of the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of
Court, and further that I caused four copies thereof to be
delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, on this ninth day of
1990, to the following at the address indicated.
Raymond Scott Berry
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
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nine
this
hand
May,

APPENDIX

A

(ORIGINAL OPINION OP THIS COURT}

COTTONWOOD MALL CO. v. SINE

Utah

499

Cite M 767 FM 499 (t)uh IMS)

COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY
Plaintiff, Appellee, and
Croat—Appellant.
v.
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood
Bowling Lanes, et al., Defendant,
Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, a
joint venture, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Defendant and Appellant.
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
Inc., Intervenor.
Nos. 19839, 19861.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 17, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1989.
Lessor brought action to recover possession of space occupied by lessee. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J.
Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment in
favor of lessor and denied attorney fees to
lessor. Lessee appealed judgment in favor
of lessor and lessor appealed denial of attorney fees. The Supreme Court, Howe,
Associate C.J., held that: (1) trial court
properly declined to find or make an agreement to renew a lease which had terminated by its own terms at its expiration date
where commercial lessor and lessee had
failed to negotiate a renewal on their own,
and (2) provision in lease regarding attorney fees remained binding on lessee
deemed to have established a month-tomonth tenancy with lessor where no evidence as to modification of the provision
was presented.
Affirmed, and case remanded to determine amount of fees and costs.
1. Joint Adventures *»8
Joint venture can bring suit in its common name without the necessity of naming
the joint venturers as plaintiffs.

2. Landlord and Tenant *=»81lA
Trial court properly declined to fmd or
make an agreement to renew a lease which
had terminated by its own terms at its
expiration date in situation where commercial lessor and lessee had failed to negotiate a renewal on their own.
3. Landlord and Tenant *=»44(1)
Proof of a holdmg over after the expiration of a fixed term m a lease gives rise
to the presumption, which in the absence of
contrary evidence will be controlling, that
the holdover tenant continues to be bound
by the covenants which were binding upon
him during the fixed term; this rule prevails even though certain of the provisions
in the expired lease are changed.
4. Landlord and Tenant $=285(9)
In absence of evidence by either party
that provisions and conditions of written
lease were modified during month-to-month
tenancy, except for the increase in the
amount of rent, provision in written lease
regarding attorney fees remained binding
on the parties until expiration of month-tomonth tenancy established as a result of
lessee holding over.

Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for
Cottonwood Mall Co.
Jack L. Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for
Wesley F. Sine.
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Cottonwood Mall Co., a joint
venture, brought this action to recover possession of space in the Cottonwood Mall
occupied by defendant Wesley F. Sine and
intervenor Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
Inc., a corporation of which Sine is the
president. Defendant and intervenor (hereinafter defendant or Sine) counterclaimed
to enforce an alleged oral agreement to
renew the expired lease under which the
space was held. From a judgment in favor
of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Plaintiff
cross-appeals from the denial of an award

500
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of attorney fees incurred in recovering possession of the space.
On May 4, 1961, Sidney M. Horman, as
lessor, and S.W. Pugsley, as lessee, entered
into a twenty-year lease of space in the
Cottonwood Hall, a shopping center in Salt
Lake County, Utah, to be used for bowling
lanes. In 1979, Sine was contemplating the
purchase of the outstanding stock of Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corporation, which operated the bowling lanes.
The corporation was controlled by Pugsley's son. Sine caused his real estate
agents to approach Horman and inquire as
to his willingness to renew the lease which
was due to expire on September 14, 1981.
On at least two occasions, Horman advised
the agents that he would be willing to
renew the lease on reasonable terms, but
that he would not sign a new agreement
until closer to the time the lease expired.
Allegedly based on these representations,
Sine purchased the outstanding stock of
the Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., for
$338,000, took an assignment of the lease,
and began to operate the bowling lanes.
Prior to expending money for improvements on his newly acquired space, Sine
again requested his agents to inquire of
Horman regarding renewal of the lease.
Horman allegedly assured the agents that
he would renew the lease on reasonable
terms at or about the time the present
lease would expire. Sine contends that he
spent $10,000 to $20,000 to improve and
remodel the leased space, based on the
additional representation by Horman and
his reputation for being a man of his word.
Horman's interest in the lease was thereafter assigned to plaintiff.
Prior to the expiration of the lease, plaintiff notified defendant that the lease would
expire by its terms on September 14, 1981,
and that defendant would become a tenant
on a month-to-month basis as provided for
in the lease. In October of 1981, plaintiff
increased the monthly rental substantially
and shortly thereafter notified defendant
that the month-to-month tenancy was terminated and the premises should be vacated by November 30, 1981. Defendant did
not vacate by that date, as the parties were

involved in negotiating a new lease. When
those efforts failed, plaintiff brought this
action to recover possession and its attorney fees thereby incurred. Defendant
counter-claimed, seeking to enforce Horman's oral promise to renew upon reasonable terms. Before trial, defendant vacatr
ed and moved to other premises. The trial
court denied defendant any relief on its
counterclaim and awarded judgment to
plaintiff for the reasonable rental value of
the leased space during the time that defendant occupied it after the expiration of
the written lease. Plaintiff, however, was
refused any attorney fees. Defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals from the
judgment.
I
In its answer to plaintif f s complaint, defendant asserted the defense of lack of
standing of plaintiff, a joint venture, to sue
in the name of the joint venture as indispensable parties plaintiff It argued that
the individual members ai-e the "real party
in interest" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). The trial court denied a pretrial
motion to dismiss the complaint based on
this defense. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1
(1981, Supp.1987) defines a "joint venture"
as "an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise" and provides that the
property and transfer rights of joint ventures shall be governed by the same statutes as general partnerships. Sections 481-1 through -40 contain Utah's adaptation
of the Uniform Partnership Act Its provisions are silent on whether a partnership
may sue in its own name. Rule 17(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
partnership may be sued in its common
name, but whether the partnership may
sue is not specified. We noted in Kemp v.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984),
that whether a partnership is empowered
to sue in the partnership's name has not
been decided in this state. Earlier in Wall
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc., 593 P.2d 542 (ttah 1979), we held
that a limited partnership is a statutory
creation and, having characteristics somewhat similar to corporations, could sue in

Utah 501
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the courts of this state in its own name
without identifying its partners or making
them plaintiffs. We noted in that case that
the common law rule that partners were
required to join as plaintiffs in actions to
enforce partnership rights has been criticized as a "useless relic of strict procedural
rules with nothing, apparently, to justify
its continued existence" and that the modern tendency is to depart from it
Recently, in Gary Energy Corp, v. Metro Oil Products, 114 F.R.D. 69 (D.Utah
1987), Judge Winder analyzed the issue under Utah law and concluded that a joint
venture can bring suit in its common name
without the necessity of naming the joint
venturers as plaintiffs. Noting our criticism in Wall Investment Co. of the common law rule and the tendency of courts to
depart from it, Judge Winder opined that
this Court would, when faced squarely with
the issue, hold that joint venturers may sue
in the name of the joint venture. In that
decision, he also relied upon a recent opinion, Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 714 R2d 155, 56 A.L.R.4th
1227 (Mont.1986), which came to that same
conclusion after an analysis of Montana
statutes and rules of procedure. The court
there noted that there was no statute or
rule of procedure in Montana granting
partnerships or joint ventures the right to
sue in their own names. Montana Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(b) states that the capacity of persons to sue and be sued should be
determined by appropriate statutory provisions. The court therefore looked to provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act,
which has been adopted in Montana. Section 8 of the Act (our section 48-1-5) provides that partnerships may own property.
Section 9(3Xe) (our section 48-l-6(3Xe)
speaks of partnership "claim[s]." Another
Montana statute allows partnerships to be
sued in their own names. Finally, the
court noted that partnerships are authorized to file small claims actions. In commenting on the effect of the foregoing
statutes, the court stated:
[TJhis Court has little choice but to follow the clear intent of the Montana Legislature to treat partnerships as distinct
entities with power to sue. It would be

illogical and unfair to conclude that a
partnership may own a claim but cannot
enforce it; may own property but cannot
protect it; may be sued but cannot sue;
may sue in small claims court but not in
Federal Court The Montana Legislature should not be deemed to have acted
*o capriciously.
Decker Coal Co., 714 P.2d at 157. To the
list of examples given by the Montana
court where the Uniform Partnership Act
treats a partnership as an entity, we add
section 13 of the Act (which is our section
48-1-10), making the partnership entity liable for the negligence of one of the partners while acting within the ordinary
course of the business of the partnership.
See Wayne-Oakland Bank v. Adams' Rib,
48 Mich.App. 144, 210 N.W.2d 121 (1973)
(where a partnership was held liable for a
partner's negligence even though the partner had immunity under the law by reason
of his parental relation to the injured party).
tl] We agree with the analysis and reasoning of Judge Winder in Gary Energy
Corp. and with the Montana Supreme
Court in Decker Coal Co. and hold that the
trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
II
Defendant contends that the expressed
affirmations and promises of Horman and
defendant's reliance thereon either renewed the written lease or, in the alternative, entitled defendant to a renewal of the
lease upon "reasonable terms." In that
event, "reasonable terms" would be based
on the written lease, the only issues to be
determined being the amount of rent and
thfe term of the renewed lease. This contention is fully answered by Pingree v.
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d
1317 (Utah 1976). There, the lease granted
thfe lessee the option to renew the lease for
two separate additional five-year terms
upon the same terms and conditions of the
original lease, except
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that the rental amount will be renegotiated; however, maximum total monthly
rental shall not exceed $900 per month.
Factors of tax increase, costs of business increases or decreases, business volume and success, insurance costs and
other reasonable allowances, will be the
basis for terms of negotiation.
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320.
The lessee gave timely notice of his exercise of the option to renew. The lessors
responded that the new rental would be
$900 per month, basing their demand on
the increase in taxes and insurance and
what they considered to be a fair return on
their investment in the leased premises.
The lessee replied and proposed $500-permonth rent based on his increased costs of
doing business and a decrease in his volume. When the parties were unable to
agree on the rent for the renewal period,
the lessor brought an action to recover
possession. The lessee counterclaimed for
enforcement of a five-year renewal at $500
per month. The trial court found that the
parties had impliedly agreed on a reasonable rental figure which the court determined and fixed at $900 per month. On
appeal, this Court reversed the trial court,
stating that it had nullified the express
factors specified by the parties in the lease
and had substituted a new agreement to
which the parties had not committed themselves. We held that the option to renew
was too vague and indefinite to be enforce
able and that the lease terminated at the
end of the original term. We cited with
approval and relied on Valcarce v. Bitters,
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961),
where we stated, "[A] condition precedent
to the enforcement of any contract is that
there be a meeting of the minds of the
parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." In so ruling, this
Court followed what was termed the majority rule in Slayter v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616,
264 P.2d 444 (1953), which was stated to be
that a provision for the extension or renewal of a lease must specify the time
the lease is to extend and the rate of rent
to be paid with such a degree of certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to

future determination. If it falls short of
this requirement, it is not enforceable.
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. In reversing
the trial court, this Court expressly rejected its attempt to fix a reasonable rent for
the parties when their negotiations bogged
down.
[2] Defendant would have us now do
what we refused to do in Pingree. While it
is true that defendant adduced evidence as
to what would be a reasonable renewal
term and what would be a reasonable rent,
the trial court properly spurned defendant's invitation to find or make an agreement where the parties had themselves
failed. Defendant argues that in Pingree,
the court declined to fix the renewal rent
because of the difficulty in balancing the
several factors which the lease required the
parties to consider in fixing the rent.
Here, defendant's argument continues, no
factors are listed in the lease and the task
is less complicated. We do not agree. In
determining what is "reasonable rent,"
many factors must be weighed and put into
the equation. Business judgments must be
made. Horman testified that he would not
negotiate a new lease at the time Sine's
real estate agents approached him because
of inflation and instability in the commercial leasing market. He was unwilling to
enter into another lease, either long term
or short term, unless he could consider the
costs of operating and owning the building
as they compared to the amount of rent
received. He only indicated that he would
be willing to enter into a new lease at a
reasonable figure and at the appropriate
time. After he sold his interest in the
leased property to plaintiff, plaintiff and
defendant were unable to agree on the
amount of rent. Courts simply are not
equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating commercial world
and are even less prepared \o impose paternalistic agreements on litigants. We therefore conclude that the written lease terminated by its own terms at its expiration
date, was not renewed by the parties, and
cannot be renewed for them by the courts.

COTTONWOOD MALL CO. v. SINE

Utah 5 0 3

Clle ft* 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988)

as, for example, the provision as to the
amount of rent to be paid.
Turning now to plaintiffs cross-appeal,
Applying those rules to the instant case,
namely, that the trial court erred in denywhen
the twenty-year term of the 1961
ing it attorney fees, plaintiffs claim for fee
written
lease expired on September 14,
was premised on the following provision in
1981, defendant held over on a month-tothe 1961 written lease:
month basis and continued to be bound by
If, during the terms of this lease, lessor
the provisions and conditions of the written
is required to commence any action to
lease during that holdover period. The
collect any of the rental due under this
fact that on October 12, 1981, plaintiff notilease, or to enforce any of the provisions
fied defendant that the monthly rental was
herein, or to secure possession of the being increased from $2,150 per month to
leased premises in the event this lease is $4,500 per month did not affect the binding
terminated as herein provided, or at the force of the other provisions of the written
expiration of the term, lessee agrees, in lease. On October 23, 1981, plaintiff adsuch event or events, to pay all costs of vised defendant that it had elected to "nulsuch action or actions, together with rea- lify" the month-to-month tenancy and resonable attorney's fee.
quested that defendant vacate the premises
The trial court denied fees "for the reason by November 30, 1981. Since there was no
that the lease agreement upon which plain- evidence by either party that the provisions
tiff makes claim for attorney's fees expired and conditions of the written lease were
by its terms, and the plaintiff terminated modified during the month-to-month tenanthe lease agreement and treated the lease cy, except for the increase in the amount of
agreement as though it had expired and rent, the provision in the 1961 lease regarding attorney fees remained binding on the
been terminated
"
parties until the month-to-month tenancy
[3,4] We do not agree with that conclu- expired on November 30, 1981. At that
sion. It is true that the 1961 written lease time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and
was for a twenty-year term that expired on when it failed to do so, the provision for the
September 14, 1981; however, paragraph payment of attorney fees became opera36 of that lease provided: "Any holdover tive. As will be noted, that provision spebeyond the termination of this lease, and cifically covers actions by the lessor to
any acceptance of rental beyond the term secure possession of the premises at the
of this lease shall be deemed to have estab- expiration of the lessee's term, which under
lished a month-to-month tenancy as be- the rule stated above includes the holdover
tween lessor and lessee/' Nothing is there period. Consequently, the trial court erred
stated, however, regarding whether the in denying any award of attorney fees to
provisions and conditions of the written plaintiff.
lease are binding on the parties during the
The judgment is affirmed, and the case is
month-to-month tenancy. It is a firmly es- remanded to the trial court to determine
tablished rule that proof of a holding over and fix the amount of attorney fees and
after the expiration of a fixed term in a trial and appeal costs to which plaintiff is
lease gives rise to the presumption, which entitled under paragraph 33 of the written
in the absence of contrary evidence will be lease.
controlling, that the holdover tenant continues to be bound by the covenants which
HALL, CJ., and STEWART,
were binding upon him during the fixed DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ,
term. Annotation, Binding Effect on Ten- concur.
ant Holding Over of Covenants in Expired Lease, 49 A.L.R.2d 480 (1956). It is
(O EKEYNUMBltSYSUM,
2 /"^*"**^V
further pointed out there that this rule
obtains even though certain of the provisions in the expired lease are changed, such
Ill
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY,
a joint venture.
Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs.
WESLEY F. SINE, d/b/a
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES,
an individual and COTTONWOOD
BOWLING LANES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C82-2081
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of the Judges of the
above-entitled Court, on September 7, 1983, at the hour of 10:00
a.m.

The Plaintiff was represented by Raymond Scott Berry.

Defendant Wesley F. Sine was represented by Jack L. Schoenhals.
Defendant Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc. was represented by Ronald
C. Barker.

The parties having advised the Court that they were

ready to proceed, the Plaintiff and Defendant having called
witnesses and the same having been sworn and having giving
testimony, and the parties having introduced evidence, and the
same having been received by the Court, and the Court having heard

argument of counsel and having been fully advised in the premises,

the parties having rested their cases, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 6,
1984, enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendants, jointly and severally, on February 27, 1984, awarding
Plaintiff, among other relief, the sum of $32,700, said sum to
bear interest thereon at 12% per annum from date of entry.
Subsequently, Defendants appealed the decision of the
trial court.

Plaintiff cross-appealed on the refusal of the trial

court to award Plaintiff attorney's fees.

On or about March 9,

1984, Defendants filed a Supersedeas Appeal Bond, naming Jerry
Sine and Dora Sine as sureties, in the amount of $65,400. The
action was briefed and argued before the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, which rendered a decision thereon on November 17,
1988, rejecting Defendants1 appeal, but granting Plaintiff's
appeal on the matter of an award of attorney's fees.
Thereafter, Defendant Wesley F. Sine filed a Petition for
lehearing.

Said Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Supreme

:ourt of the State of Utah on or about January 25, 1989, and the
atter duly remitted to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District
ourt for further action pursuant to the opinion of the Utah
upreme Court.

Pursuant to that opinion and in conformance

herewith, this Court hereby enters its amended judgment in favor
Plaintiff and against Defendants as follows:
JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiff is awarded an amended judgment against the

fendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $104,014.77,

and against Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, jointly and severally, as
sureties, to the extent of $65,400, as per the calculations set
forth below:
Description

Amount

Original trial court judgment of
$32,700,00 with interest thereon
from February 27, 1984 through
February 27, 1989 calculated as per
the Court's Minute Entry of
April 13, 1989:

$ 52,320.00

Attorney's fees incurred by
Plaintiff in the pre-judgment phase
of these proceedings, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum in the amount of:

39,744,62

Post-judgment attorney's fees in
the amount of:

6,641.58
TOTAL:

$ 98,706.20

Said amount to bear interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
in conformance with the original judgment entered herein.
2.

The claims of the Plaintiff insofar as they relate to

an unlawful detainer action be, and the same are, hereby
dismissed, no cause of action.
3.

The Defendants' Counterclaims be, and the same are,

hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, no cause of
action.
4.

The Defendants have no right, title or interest in

and to the property which is the subject matter of this action.
DATED this

fl^day

of

^ffe

, 1989.

COURT
MC173:34
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28.

Lessor reserves the right to change or add to or subtract from the improve-

ments from time to time constituting a part of Cottonwood Shopping Center, including
the erection of additional buildings, if Lessor so ducts; provided, however, that
parking and maneuvering area shall be provided in the adjoining area to allow for
equal car parking ratio per square foot of ground floor of buildings as is now shown
on attached plot plan marked exhibit B, hereto attached.

etting or
gnment

29.

Lessee shall not allow or permit any transfer of this Lease or any interest

under it, or any lien upon Lessee's interest by operation of law, or assign or convey
this Lease, or any interest under it, or sublet the premises or any part thereof, or
permit the use or occupancy of the premises or any part thereof by anyone other than
Lessee without the written consent of Lessor.
*rved Rights
essor

30.

Lessor reserves the following rights:
(a) to change the name or street address of the building without notice or
liability of Lessor to Lessee,
(b) to enter the premises or any part thereof at reasonable hours to make inspections, repairs, alterations, or additions in or to the premises or the
building, to exhibit the premises to prospective tenants, purchasers, or
others, to display during the last ninety days of the term without hindrance
or molestation by Lessee "For Rent" and similar signs on windows or
elsewhere in or on the premises, and to perform any acts related to the
safety, protection, preservations, reletting, sale, or improvements of
the premises or the building; and
(c) during the last ninety days of the term, or any part thereof, if during or
prior to that time Lessee vacates the p r e m i s e s , to enter and decorate,
remodel, repair, alter, or otherwise prepare the premises for reoccupancy.
The exercise of any of these reserved rights by Lessor shall never be deemed

an eviction or disturbance of Lessee's use and possession of the premises and shall
never render Lessor liable in any manner to Lessee or to any other person.
and Other
talty

31. If the premises or the building are made wholly untenantable by fire or other
casualty, Lessor may elect:
(a) to terminate the term of this Lease as of the date of the fire, or other
casualty, by notice to Lessee within thirty days after the date, or
(b) to repair, restore, or rehabilitate the building or the premises at Irsior'*?
expense within one hundred twenty days after Lessor is enabled to take
possession of the injured premises, and to undertake the repairs, restoration, or rehabilitation, in which latter event the term of this Lease shall
not terminate, but the fixed rent shall be abated on a per diem ba*?is while
the premises are untenantable. If Lessor elects to repair, restore, or
rehabilitate the building or premises, and does not substantially complete

7

the work within the 120-day period, due allowance being made for any
prevention of Lessor's so doing by'reason of practical impossibility,
either party can terminate this LeaseVm of the date of the fire or other
casualty by notice to the other party not later than one hundred thirty
days after Lessor is enabled to take possession of the injured premises
and to undertake the repairs, restoration, or rehabilitation. In event of
termination of the term of this Lease pursuant to this section, fixed rents
shall be apportioned on a per diem basis and be paid to the date of the fire
or other casualty, and percentage rentai shall be paid to the termination
of this Lease.
Unless wilfully caused, JLessee shall not be liable to Lessor for loss or damage
to the premises or trade fixtures or equipment by fire as a result of any act or omission on the part of Lessee or any of his employees for whom Lessee may be legally
responsible if said demised premises, trade fixtures, and equipment are covered by
insurance.
32o Lessor and Lessor's agents and servants shall not be liable and Lessee
waives all claims for damage to person or property sustained by Lessee or any occupant of the building or premises resulting from the building or premises or any part
of either, or any equipment or appurtenance being or becoming out of repair, or resuiting from any accident in or about the building, or resulting directly or indirectly
from any act or neglect of any tenant or occupant of the building or of any other person.
33. Time is of the essence of this agreement. In the event Lessee fails to keep
any covenant, agreement, or promise as in this Lease set forth, then the same shall
constitute a breach hereof on the part of Lessee, and at the option of Lessor this
Lease may be terminated by Lessor giving five days notice in writing if the breach is
non-payment of rent, or thirty days notice in writing in the event of breach of any
other covenant or agreement, of its election to terminate this Lease for the breach of
any covenant herein contained, providing said breach is not remedied, corrected, or
m a 6 whole by Lessee during said period. The failure of Lessor to terminate this
Lease at any time during the breach of any of the terms hereof shall be deemed only
an indulgence by Lessor for that particular breach, and shall not be construed to be
a waiver of the rights of Lessor as to any further or subsequent breach. If, during
the terms of this Lease, Lessor is required to commence any action to collect any of
v

.he rental due under this Lease, or to enforce any of the provisions herein, or to

secure possession of the leased premises in the event this Lease is terminated as
herein provided, or at the expiration of the term, Lessee agrees, in such event or

events, to pay all costs of such action or actions, together

witn

reasonable attorney's

fee.
Ivency of
see

34. In the event Lessee is adjudicated a bankrupt, or a Petition in Bankruptcy is
filed against Lessee, and is not dismissed within sixty days thereafter, or Lessee
voluntarily offers to creditors terms of composition, or in case a Receiver is appointed to take charge and conduct the affairs of Lessee, Lessor may, at its option,
declare this Lease terminated and null and void, and may re-enter the premises immediately. In such event, the next subsequent twelve installments of rent, or such
unpaid, shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of Lessor without notice
to Lessee, and such claim for further unpaid installments of rent due under this
Lease shall be considered liquidated damages and shall constitute a debt provable in
bankruptcy or receivership. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the
right of Lessor to prove its claim in such bankruptcy or receivership for installments of rent due and unpaid at the time of such bankruptcy or receivership, regardless of whether Lessor elects to terminate this Lease as hereinabove provided.

render of
session

35. All Lessee installations or additions to the premises which cannot be removed
without damage to the premises shall be deemed Lessor's property; provided, however, that Lessor may elect prior to the termination of the Lease, or within ten days
thereafter, to require Lessee to remove any installation or addition at Lessee's expense. Lessee shall, prior to any such termination of the term of this Lease, or at
Lessee's right to possession, remove from the premises ail Lessee's furniture,
trade fixtures, and other personal property of every kind whatsoever not becoming
Lessor's property as hereinbefore specified, and in default of such removal by
Lessee all such property and every interest of Lessee in the same, shall be conclusively presumed to have been conveyed by Lessee to Lessor under this Lease as
a Bill of Sale without compensation, allowance, or credit to Lessee. Lessee shall,
upon such termination of the term of this Lease or of Lessee's right to possession,
return to Lessor the premises and all equipment and fixtures comprising a part
thereof in as good condition as when Lessee took possession, excepting only ordinary
wear and tear and damage by fire or other casualty for which Lessee is not legally
responsible.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY,
a joint venture,
AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,

WESLEY F. SINE, d/b/a
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES,
an individual and COTTONWOOD
BOWLING LANES, INC*, a Utah
corporation,

C i v i l No. C82-2081

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action through its
undersigned counsel, Raymond Scott Berry, respectfully submits the
following Affidavit of Attorney's Fees in support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment filed herewith.
Raymond Scott Berry, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

That affiant is an adult resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, with personal knowledge of the facts stated
herein.

Affiant1s actual knowledge of the facts stated herein

Plaintiff throughout the proceedings*

Affiant is a current member

of the Utah State Bar, and has been at all times mentioned herein.
2.
1982.

This action was initiated by Plaintiff in March of

The action was aggressively litigated by all parties.

Extensive pre-trial work was required, as the size of the court's
file will indicate.
parties.

Substantial discovery was conducted by all

The action was tried to the Court in September of 1983,

and judgment initially was entered herein on February 27, 1984.
3.

Affiant has reviewed his billing records relative to

this action, including the individual monthly bills and the client
ledger.

Those documents indicate that attorney's fees incurred by

the Plaintiff in the pre-judgment phase of this action, including
office costs passed on the Plaintiff directly, total $22,552.17.
Adding interest to that figure at the rate of 12% per annum as per
the initial interest figure contained in the original judgment,
brings the total attorney's fee figure for the pre-judgment phase
to $39,744.62.
4.

Following the trial court decision this matter was

appealed by Defendants, and Plaintiff cross-appealed on the trial
court's denial of an award of attorney's fees.

Briefs were duly

prepared and filed, and the matter was argued orally to the Utah
Supreme Court in June of 1987. The decision of the Utah Supreme
Court was issued on November 17, 1988, affirming the trial court
in regard to the judgment rendered against the Defendants, but
reversing the trial court as to its decision to deny Plaintiff's
recovery of attorney's fees.

5.

Following issuance of the decision Defendants filed a

Petition for Rehearing with the Utah Supreme Court,

Plaintiff was

invited to respond to the Petition for Rehearing by the Utah
Supreme Court.

Plaintiff duly filed an answer to Defendant's

Petition for Rehearing.

Petition for Rehearing was denied

effective January 25, 1989.
6.

Affiant's review of his office records as referred to

above indicates post-judgment attorney's fees in the amount of
$6,641.58.
7.

Attached to this Affidavit are true and correct

copies of the affiant's office ledger records indicating amounts
actually charged by affiant to Plaintiff.
8.

Further affiant sayeth not.

DATED this

/

day of

tf\o\W\

, 1989.

GREEN & BERRY
/A*/'
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY
Attorney for Plaintiff

UBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
•7
# 1989.

My Commi

MC173:3-J

day of

NOTARY(JPUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah

Green and Berty
Client Ledger Card

/88
e Development, Inc.
:e/Cottonwood Mall v. Sine
: Number: P-124.47-82
igement Division
i: Carolyn Okumura
:entury Parkway
; Lake City
UT 84115
le: 486-39H

Amount

Balance From Last Statement
2/88
Lved

JVL

1/88
ived

RSB

8/88 RSB
rocess
1/88 RSB
rocess

$ 60/hr
.25 Hours
$15.00
Telephone conference to Supreme Court
clerk; review of file, draft of Motion
to Reconsider Adequacy of Supersedeas
Bond; review of rules re: bonds;
$ 85/hr
2.00 Hours
$170.00
Appearance at Motion to Reconsider
Adequacy of Supersedeas Bond and
Drafting Supreme Court Motion;
$ 85/hr
.50 Hours
$42.50
Review Supreme Court Opinion; telephone
conference with Mike Frei;
$ 85/hr
.75 Hours
$63 75
Draft withdrawal of Motion regarding
Supersedeas Bonds;

Balance
$185.00
$15.00

$185.00

$227.50
$291.25

Ledger Card Totals - All Entries
(Including Archived Entries)
Total Ledger Entries . . .
Less Work in Process . . .
Total Billed Entries This Report . . .
Case Information Through 11/21/88
Total Amount Billable . . .
Less Total Work in Process .
Total Amount Owing . . .

1

Litigation
Standard: Show W.I.P, on Bills
Monthly
Trust Balance:
None
Case Rate: $85.00
Case Attorney: RSB
APR Interest: None

Description

:e

PAGE

$291.25
-$106.25
$185.00
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